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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Zachariah Charles Pittman appeals from the district court’s denial of his objection
to the restitution order.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Pittman pleaded guilty to heroin trafficking via a binding Rule 11 plea agreement.
(R., pp. 205-09.) One term of the Rule 11 agreement was that “Restitution shall be
submitted within thirty (30) days by the State.” (R., p. 205.)
At the change of plea hearing, Pittman stated that he read through the Rule 11
agreement, agreed with it, and “signed off on it.” (5/08/17 Tr., p. 1, Ls. 15-21.) The state
indicated that the restitution request had been given to Pittman’s attorney and the court.
(5/08/17 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 1-7.) The district court agreed to the sentence set forth in the Rule
11 agreement and specifically brought up restitution:
THE COURT: Now, is there anything that you thought should be a part of
this agreement or is part of this agreement that I have not done at
sentencing?
THE DEFENDANT: Absolutely not.
THE COURT: All right. How about, [defense counsel] Mr. Dykman,
anything on your part?
MR. DYKMAN: No, Your Honor, because they’ve already dismissed the
second or subsequent defense. And we have no objection to the restitution
since they already submitted it.
THE COURT: And I haven’t ordered that yet, so let me do that now.
In the 2015 file, there’s a request for restitution for $1,595. The defense
has no objection to that?
MR. DYKMAN: No.

1

THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Then I will grant that request.
(5/08/17 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 5-21 (emphasis added).)
The parties then had a discussion about court costs and the mandatory fine
associated with the charge:
[THE COURT:] I will also impose in this case—there’s got to be court
costs. How much are they?
THE CLERK: $285.50.
THE COURT: $285.50. I will waive all other costs. There will be no fine
in this case.
[PROSECUTOR] MS. PRICE: It’s actually a mandatory fine.
THE COURT: Oh, there’s a mandatory fine.
MS. PRICE: It’s a mandatory $10,000 fine.
MR. DYKMAN: There is.
MS. PRICE. So that could impact the Court’s fine and court costs and
restitution depending on what you decide. It’s in your discretion, but—
THE COURT: Now say that again.
MS. PRICE: I was saying there’s a $10,000 fine. It’s mandatory.
THE COURT: Then I will impose the $10,000 fine—
MS. PRICE: So that could affect the restitution and the fines and court
costs if the Court so desires, so—
THE COURT: Are you saying I can waive the other two, but I can’t waive
the $10,000?
MS. PRICE: Well, I say no, but you have the discretion, so—
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THE COURT: Okay. I’m going to impose the court costs and I’m going to
impose the mandatory fine of $10,000. I’m not going to impose anything
else beyond that.
Is there anything else we need to do today?
THE DEFENDANT: So the 285.55 [sic] and then the 10,000?
THE COURT: Yes.
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Thank you.
THE COURT: Is part—it’s on top of the 10,000.
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I know.
THE COURT: I have to do that.
THE DEFENDANT: Thank you.
THE COURT: What was that, Amy?
THE CLERK: The restitution too?
THE COURT: The restitution I ordered.
THE CLERK: Okay.
(5/08/17 Tr., p. 11, L. 22 – p. 13, L. 10 (emphasis added).) The district court’s judgment
reflected the above exchange: the court ordered Pittman to pay $285.50 in court costs, a
$10,000 fine, and $1,595 “[f]or the payment of restitution in this matter.” (R., pp. 21920.) Pittman was sentenced to a unified term of 15 years with 5 years fixed. (R., p. 219.)
Pittman filed a Rule 35 motion for leniency. (R., pp. 232-33.) In it, Pittman
acknowledged he had been sentenced according to a “binding Rule 11 Agreement”; he
nevertheless asked the Court to “reconsider the sentence imposed” and “reduce the fixed
and indeterminate portions of the Defendant’s sentence as it would be in the best interest
of justice.” (R., p. 232.)
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At the Rule 35 motion hearing, the court denied Pittman’s motion in light of the
Rule 11 Agreement. (7/10/17 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 10-22; R. p. 237.) The court noted that it
had “a real problem with a defendant getting a binding Rule 11 that we all agreed to and
then trying to twist a little better deal out of it.” (7/10/17 Tr., p. 14, Ls 15-18.) After the
motion was denied, Pittman’s counsel raised another issue:
…One other matter. [Pittman] did write me a letter. He indicated that he
wanted me to file an objection to restitution. He indicated you waived the
restitution, but I don’t have any recollection of that. I’d have to review the
records, but—
THE COURT: That I waived the restitution?
MR. DYKMAN: Yeah. He wanted me to file an objection to that, and he
also wanted me to file a motion for a turnover. So if you’d give me another
day, I’ll just file those motions and we can hear them.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I will just tell you the Rule 11 agreement says
“restitution shall be submitted within 30 days.”
MR. DYKMAN: I know.
THE COURT: They did that. I don’t remember ever waiving it, so you’ll
have to get me some kind of proof that I did.
MR. DYKMAN: I don’t recall that, to be honest, but I just have to respond
to his letter, so—
THE COURT: Okay. Well, we’ll leave that pending till you file
something.
(7/10/17 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 1-22.)
Pittman filed an “Objection To Restitution Regarding Prosecutor’s Costs And
Narcotic Enforcement Costs.” (R., pp. 241-42.) In it, he outlined a single factual
statement and a single legal argument as “good cause” for objecting to the restitution:
1. The Defendant’s [sic] signed off and agreed to restitution in the Rule
11 agreement.
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2. The Defendant’s position is that Judge Nye at the sentencing waived
the state prosecutor’s costs and narcotic enforcement costs.
(R., p. 241.)
The district court held a hearing on Pittman’s objection to the restitution, where,
apparently, 1 Pittman contended “the sentencing court [originally] awarded the restitution
but later changed his mind and refused to award those amounts.” (See Aug., p. 3.) The
state apparently argued the district court awarded the restitution and did not change its
mind. (See Aug., p. 3.)
The district court concluded, based on a review of the sentencing hearing
transcript, that the sentencing judge had “made it clear on two occasions” during the
hearing that it was awarding restitution. (Aug., p. 4.) Moreover, the court concluded,
Pittman “bound himself to pay the restitution sought by the State” in the Rule 11
agreement. (Aug., p. 4.) The district court accordingly denied Pittman’s challenge to the
restitution order and reaffirmed the sentence. (Aug., p. 5.)
Pittman timely appealed. (R., pp. 223-25.)

1

While the record indicates the hearing on the objection took place on August 22, 2017,
the hearing transcript has not been made part of the record on appeal. (See R., pp. 12,
247.)
5

ISSUE
Pittman states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Pittman’s objection to the
restitution?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Pittman failed to show the district court erred in denying his objection to
restitution?
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ARGUMENT
Pittman Fails To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Objection To The
Restitution
Pittman contends the district court erred in denying his objection to restitution
“for two reasons”: 1) because the “sentencing court’s pronouncement at the time of
sentencing made it clear that the court intended to order Mr. Pittman to pay the court
costs and the mandatory fine, only, not restitution”; and 2) the court clearly erred in
determining the plea bound Pittman to paying the restitution, because the agreement only
stated that “restitution shall be submitted within thirty (30) days,” and as such “impose[d]
no obligation on Mr. Pittman to pay the amount requested.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6.)
These arguments fail. Pittman’s first claim, like his only claim below, essentially
argues there was a clerical error in the judgment—the “judgment should have been
corrected to reflect the sentencing court’s pronouncement and include only the fine and
court costs.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) Courts may retroactively correct such errors; for
example, “[a] clerical error in typing a written judgment that directly conflicts with an
orally pronounced sentence can be corrected by the trial court at any time.” State v.
Allen, 144 Idaho 875, 878, 172 P.3d 1150, 1153 (Ct. App. 2007); I.C.R. 36.
But here there was no such error to correct: the judgment matched the sentencing
court’s oral pronouncement. (Compare R., p. 219 (ordering restitution of $1595) with
5/08/17 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 17-21 (stating a restitution request for $1595 would be ordered, to
which Pittman had no objection).) And the sentencing court never said it was revisiting
or otherwise disturbing its restitution order. (See 5/08/17 Tr., p. 12, L. 19 – p. 13, L. 9.)
As the reviewing court below correctly pointed out, the sentencing court specifically
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ordered restitution (5/08/17 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 17-21), and after discussing fines and costs, it
reaffirmed that it had already ordered restitution:
THE COURT: What was that Amy?
THE CLERK: The restitution too?
THE COURT: The restitution I ordered.
THE CLERK: Okay.
(5/08/17 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 7-10.) The district court therefore correctly concluded that the
sentencing court “made it clear on two occasions during the sentencing hearing that he
was awarding the restitution, one before and one after the statement focused on by the
Defendant.” (Aug., p. 2.) And because the judgment accurately reflected the sentence
and restitution order as pronounced, there was no error to correct.
Pittman’s other argument fails because he is raising it for the first time on appeal.
Below, Pittman never argued that the restitution term in the plea agreement “imposes no
obligation on Mr. Pittman to pay the amount requested, or to pay restitution at all….”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) Pittman’s “objection to the restitution” below only provided a
single theory of relief: that the judgment did not accurately reflect the district court’s
purported mid-hearing decision to waive restitution. (R., p. 241.)
Pittman did not contend below, however, that the plea agreement did not actually
impose an obligation to pay restitution. (Compare R., p. 241 with Appellant’s brief, pp.
5-6.) Because Pittman did not raise this theory below, he cannot do so for the first time
on appeal. State v. Garcia–Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, ___, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017)
(“Issues not raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal, and the parties
will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court.”).
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Alternatively, even if this newfound theory had been preserved, it fails on the
merits. While ambiguous language is ordinarily construed in the defendant’s favor, State
v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491, 496, 283 P.3d 808, 813 (Ct. App. 2012), here, there is no
ambiguity to construe. Pittman’s own “objection” dispelled any ambiguity about his
conception of the plea agreement when it stated, in unequivocal terms, that Pittman
“signed off and agreed to restitution in the Rule 11 agreement.” (R., p. 241.) Likewise,
Pittman’s own attorney stated below that they had “no objection” to the court entering an
order based on the state’s restitution request:
MR. DYKMAN: No, Your Honor, because they’ve already dismissed the
second or subsequent defense. And we have no objection to the restitution
since they already submitted it.
THE COURT: And I haven’t ordered that yet, so let me do that now.
In the 2015 file, there’s a request for restitution for $1,595. The defense
has no objection to that?
MR. DYKMAN: No.
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Then I will grant that request.
(5/08/17 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 11-21 (emphasis added).)
Pittman readily stated below that he had no objection to the court entering an
order of restitution—which, by definition, contemplates an obligation to pay. Thus, even
assuming arguendo the plea agreement was not crystal clear about Pittman’s obligations,
Pittman should not now receive a presumption of ambiguity that cuts against his own
unequivocal position below: that he had no objection to the court entering an order
obligating him to pay restitution. Accordingly, even if this claim is preserved, Pittman’s
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own stated position resolves any purported ambiguity surrounding the plea language. He
fails to show any error.
The judgment correctly reflected the district court’s restitution order; moreover,
restitution was never waived, and Pittman had no objections to the plea agreement
language. The district court correctly denied his objection.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s denial of
Pittman’s objection to the restitution.
DATED this 6th day of March, 2018.

/s/ Kale D. Gans______________________
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 6th day of March, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy
to:
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/ Kale D. Gans______________________
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
KDG/dd
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